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The learning of immediate causation within a dynamic environment was examined.
Participants encountered seven decision points in which they needed to choose, which of
three possible candidates was the cause of explosions in the environment. Each candidate
was ﬁring a weapon at random every few seconds, but only one of them produced
an immediate effect. Some participants showed little learning, but most demonstrated
increases in accuracy across time. On average, men showed higher accuracy and
shorter latencies that were not explained by differences in self-reported prior video game
experience.This result suggests that prior reports of sex differences in causal choice in the
game are not speciﬁc to situations involving delayed or probabilistic causal relations.
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INTRODUCTION
CAUSAL DISCOVERY AND GENERALIZATION CONTRIBUTION TO
FRONTIERS
Throughout our lifetime, we are faced with a complex web of
causal relationships that drive the evolution of our world. Physical
objects interact to produce changes in the physical environment.
Changes in that physical environment produce changes in the
organisms living within that environment. Those organisms pro-
duce changes in one another as they interact through direct
physical contact, auditory exchanges, olfactory cues, or other
senses. These sameorganismsbring about changes in their physical
environments. This network of causation determines the future,
and an organism’s success is directly affected by its ability to pre-
pare for this future. Identiﬁcation of causal relations permits a
person, dog, or ﬂy to improve its future by carrying an umbrella,
salivating, or avoiding a looming ﬂy swatter.
Some causal relationships seem to be readily apprehended or
perceived whereas others require a process of discovery. Research
on the former is presented as the study of causal perception (e.g.,
Michotte, 1946/1963; Schlottmann and Surian, 1999; Scholl and
Nakayama, 2004) whereas research on the latter is presented as
the study of causal learning or inference (e.g., Shanks et al., 1996;
Wasserman et al., 1996). This dichotomy assumes a natural and
categorical distinction that is less clear when people’s behavior is
examined. Causal perception is often assumed when causal judg-
ments are automatic – when there is direct physical and immediate
interaction between two objects a single observation is sufﬁcient
to elicit a conﬁdent judgment of causation. Causal learning or
inference is assumed when a series of experiences are necessary in
order to discover the relations.
However, some relationships that seem to be directly perceived
also have been shown to be affected by experience (e.g., Gruber
et al., 1957; Powesland, 1959; Young et al., 2005), and others that
are normally learned can readily generalize to anovel situation thus
producing instantaneous causal judgment (Glautier, 2004; White,
2006). Furthermore, there may be signiﬁcant individual differ-
ences in causal judgment which gives rise to questions regarding
their origin (genetic or ontogenetic). Unfortunately, the role of
experience in causal perception is often not apparent because stud-
ies frequently do not report how these judgments evolve over time
nor do they report individual differences in these judgments. This
lack of analysis is also often present in my own work on causality,
and this manuscript represents a step toward ﬁlling this gap.
In a program involving causal perception and learning within
a video game, my colleagues and I routinely use the ﬁrst block
of the game to familiarize people with the gaming environment
and to ensure understanding of the task. Decisions during this
block involve a perfect contingency (i.e., no probabilistic causal-
ity) and immediate causation. Participants are faced with trios of
candidate causes (“orcs” or monsters shooting weapons) of a dis-
tal explosion on a building that they are tasked to protect. One
of the orcs is the cause of these explosions, and it is the par-
ticipant’s task to identify this orc and eliminate it. In all of our
reported experiments, we ignore behavior during this initial block
of decisions and only report behavior once delays, probabilistic
relations, and other independent variables are introduced. In the
present project, this previously ignored data will ﬁnally receive
some attention.
During initial exposure to causal relations in the game, judg-
ment is assumed to be based on causal perception because very
little inference is required. If an orc ﬁres and an explosion imme-
diately follows, the cause should be quite evident. However, there
are two factors that make this apparently easy decision a bit more
difﬁcult. First, there are three causal candidates to choose from,
and it is possible that two of them may ﬁre in close temporal
proximity simply by chance (their ﬁring is scheduled to repeat
at random intervals). Under these conditions, it would be neces-
sary to observe a second shot by these candidates to de-confound
their actions and consequences. Second, this situation is a novel
one. Although people likely assume that the ﬁring of a weapon
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would cause an immediate consequence, some participants may
be reluctant to assume that relations observed on the ﬁring range
or television would necessarily translate to this gaming environ-
ment. Because we have not analyzed behavior during this initial
exposure, it was not known if people’s behavior evolved during
this period.
In examining behavior during initial exposure, I was also inter-
ested in revisiting the evolution of individual differences. In our
prior work, we have often reported that men have higher accura-
cies and take less time to make their decisions, but the accuracy
difference can sometimes be accounted for by differences in self-
reported video game experience by women and men (Young and
Nguyen, 2009). Are these performance differences evident at the
outset even when the causal relationship is perfect (100% and
immediate) or do they only emerge later in the game when intro-
ducing delayed or probabilistic causation? If there are differences
during this initial period, they could arise due to different inter-
cepts, indicating different preparedness for the task, or different
learning rates as participants adapt to the task. In the near absence
of prior research on sex differences in causal perception and judg-
ment, it is difﬁcult to formhypotheses. Although the small amount
of data available (e.g., Shaklee and Hall, 1983; Wasserman et al.,
1983, Wasserman and Neunaber, 1986) suggest the possible pres-
ence of sex differences in non-gaming causality tasks, sex was a
tertiary factor in these studies and thus not fully explored.
To maximize the sample size, I used data from the ﬁrst level of
the video game across four previously published experiments in
which this data was not analyzed (Young andNguyen, 2009; Young
et al., 2011a,b). I only used data from experiments and conditions
in which the training level was identical – choosing among three
targets in each of seven groups, no delays, 100% likelihood of the
weapon working, and no stress.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 213 introductory psychology students (105 women and
108 men) at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale received
course credit for their voluntary participation.
GAME ENVIRONMENT AND DESIGN
TheTorqueGameEngine (obtained fromwww.garagegames.com)
was adapted as the platform for game development. Torque’s ﬁrst-
person-shooter starter kit involves a rich world containing hills,
mountains, buildings, lakes, a crossbow that shoots exploding
projectiles, and orcs – monster-like characters. The game con-
tained seven separate regions with each region populated by three
visually identical orcs. For simplicity, the orcs were stationary and
oriented toward a target region (e.g., a building) that the player
was directed to protect. Each group of three orcs was oriented
toward a different building to maintain a distinctive target trio.
Every 4 s (on average), each orc ﬁred its weapon (an orc’s ﬁring
was noticeable from the recoil of the weapon and an audible click,
although it may or may not have produced an explosion). Specif-
ically, every 4 s each orc was programmed to ﬁre once within the
next 3 s with the precise delay chosen from a (0, 3 s) uniform dis-
tribution. For the enemy orc, its ﬁring was immediately followed
by the explosion.
The player’s task was to identify the enemy orc that was
producing the explosions and destroy it. Destruction of a sin-
gle orc required eight shots (a ﬁxed-ratio 8 or FR8 schedule),
because our pilot studies revealed that participants showed
greater discernment under these conditions because poor choices
would lengthen the game. For a video clip showing a par-
ticipant observing a trio, destroying a target (i.e., making
a choice), and observing the consequences of their choice,
see “Video game clip of basic causal task” at http://www.
k-state.edu/psych/research/young/suppmaterial.html. This clip
also shows a bird’s eye view of the entire game region.
PROCEDURE
The participants were seated at one of four identically conﬁgured
1.25 GHz Mac Mini computers. The participant received speciﬁc
verbal instructions, including a description of the task, using a
screenshot of what theywould see once the experimentwas started.
The instructions included the following:
Today you will be participating in a computer experiment. You will be
placed in a virtual village being attacked by sets of orcs. The orcs will be
ﬁring timed grenades. Only one of the orcs has a working weapon; the
others are duds. Your task is to identify and destroy the orc causing the
damage, the enemy, without shooting the duds. If you choose the right
orc, the explosions will stop and the blue bar will drop on the screen.
If you choose the wrong orc, the explosions will continue and the blue
bar will persist. Continue ﬁring on one of the remaining orcs that is
causing the damage until you discern the enemy.
In addition to the task instructions, participants were advised
how to navigate within the environment. When the participants
indicated an understanding of the procedure, the experimenter
started each of the programs.
Once a participant had destroyed all of the enemies, the
video game ended. After the period of behavior described in
the present study, participants performed other gaming deci-
sions described elsewhere (Young and Nguyen, 2009; Young et al.,
2011a,b). After ﬁnishing the game, the participants completed
a demographic questionnaire asking their sex, self-rated video
game experience during elementary school, middle school, high
school, and college (Likert scale with 0 indicating none, 6 indi-
cating daily), and types of video games that they play. Because
a principal components analysis revealed no distinct roles for
periods of experience, I summed across the four periods of
experience.
RESULTS
Both choice accuracy and the time elapsed between the previ-
ous correct decision and the ﬁrst choice at the next trio were
examined. Therefore, latency includes travel time and observa-
tion time. Unfortunately, the contamination of latencies with
travel time is unavoidable with the current design because peo-
ple can observe the targets ﬁring while traveling between the
target groups. To prevent this contamination, prior research has
occasionally placed the targets within a hut to prevent observa-
tion while traveling and to begin recording latency upon entry
into the hut (Nguyen et al., 2010; Young et al., 2011a). Although
the latencies were obviously much shorter when travel time was
removed, the relationship between the predictors and latency was
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maintained regardless of the inclusion of travel time (includ-
ing sex differences). These results suggest that travel time is
relatively constant across conditions and participants. However,
these previous studies always assessed performance after the ﬁrst
level. It is quite possible that participants would show rapid
decreases in travel time as they gain familiarity with the game
environment throughout the ﬁrst level thus making it difﬁcult
to distinguish decreases in latency due to more efﬁcient travel or
shorter observation or decision times. An alternative analysis will
be conducted on a subset of the participants to attempt to address
this issue.
I used a model comparison approach in the data analysis – the
simplestmodel of theoretical interest was chosen. Thus, terms that
did not reach statistical signiﬁcance were eliminated and higher-
order interactions involving the individual differences variables
were not examined. Because prior work with the gaming platform
often documented an association between the dependent variables
(accuracy and latency) and sex and self-reported amount of video
game experience, only those variables were examined.
All analyses were conducted using generalized linear mixed
effects modeling (also known as generalized multilevel mod-
eling). This approach is the preferred method of analyzing
repeated measures data involving non-normal error distribu-
tions (Gelman and Hill, 2006; Bolker et al., 2008; Dixon, 2008).
Because this model selection approach introduces additional
degrees of freedom (Dixon, 2013), I used the more conserva-
tive Bayesian information criterion (BIC) as a model selection
metric.
ACCURACY
Analyses of accuracy were performed on trial-level data and thus
required the speciﬁcation of a binomial distribution (i.e., I per-
formed repeated measures logistic regression). I examined two
classes of models, those using order and experience as linear
predictors and those exploring log transformations of order and
experience. A log transformation of order was considered because
behavioral change was expected to be greater for the ﬁrst few
decisions, and a log transformation of experience was consid-
ered because the experience variable was highly skewed (very few
participants reported high amounts of video game play). Adding
self-reported experience to themodels (linear or log-transformed)
produced poorer models and thus it was not included. Using a
log transformation of choice order produced a model that was
7.3 times more likely to have produced the data than the model
assuming a linear relationship and thus a log relationship was
assumed.
The best ﬁtting model only included main effects of order and
sex; the model ﬁt is shown in the left side of Figure 1. The analysis
revealed an increase in accuracy as a function of order (b = 0.61,
z = 6.04, p < 0.01) and higher accuracy for men than for women
(84% vs. 75%, z = 2.92, p < 0.01).
LATENCY
Analyses of latency were performed on trial-level data andwith the
speciﬁcation of a Gamma error distribution due to the skewed dis-
tribution of latencies (i.e., I performed repeated measures gamma
regression). I again examined two classes of models, those using
order and experience as linear predictors and those exploring log
transformations of order and experience. Using a log transfor-
mation of choice order and assuming a linear relationship with
experience produced the best model.
The best ﬁtting model only included main effects of order, sex,
and self-reported amount of video game experience; the model
ﬁt is shown in the right side of Figure 1. The analysis revealed a
decrease in latency as a function of order (b = 0.0051, z = 10.91,
p < 0.01), shorter latencies for men than for women (43.8 s
vs. 66.5 s, z = 3.82, p < 0.01), and a decrease in latency as a
function of prior video game experience (b = 0.0003, z = 3.36,
p < 0.01). Note that gamma regression uses an inverse link func-
tion thus slope estimates (betas) were positive because larger
order values or more experience result in faster times to the ﬁrst
choice.
There was a 22.7 s difference in mean latencies for men and
women at each decision point. This difference could be due to
women spendingmore time in travel between target trios or taking
more time to observe the causal relationship once they have arrived
at the targets. In trying to distinguish between these two sources,
I was able to obtain data on the navigation of the environment for
132 of the participants (this data was not retained for the other
participants). The program stored player position every 1 s during
game play. This data was used to create two measures, the total
amount of time in movement and the total amount of time sitting
still. Although participants could observe while moving, these two
measures may serve as a proxy for distinguishing differences in
navigation efﬁciency from differences in observation time. The
time spent idle includes the eight shots it took to destroy a target
(≈8–10 s), but this duration is consistent across conditions and
participants.
In examining the average time spent moving between decision
points during the ﬁrst level of the game, women took 7 s longer
thanmen [31 s vs. 24 s, t(131) = 3.01, p< 0.01]. Interestingly, this
difference was much smaller for subsequent levels that were not
part of this study (3, 2, and 1 s, for levels 2 through 4). Regardless,
this analysis suggests that part of the 23 s latency difference is due
to women taking longer to travel between target trios. Although
this result might be of interest for other lines of research, it has
little bearing on our understanding of sex differences in causal
inference.
More interestingly, the analysis of time spent idle in the game
revealed that women were idle 17 s longer than men during the
initial level [44 s vs. 27 s, t(131) = 6.47, p< 0.01]. This difference
remained quite large for subsequent levels thatwere not part of this
study (15, 10, and 9 s, for levels 2 through 4). Although the analyses
of movement time were performed on a subset of the participants,
these results suggest that the majority of the observed latency dif-
ferences betweenmen andwomen (∼23 s, see Figure 1) was due to
observation time rather thannavigation efﬁciency (∼17 s vs.∼7 s).
EVIDENCE OF PERCEIVED VERSUS INFERRED CAUSATION
When people judge an interaction to be causal without the need
to observe the relationship multiple times and can do so with
high accuracy, the process is often described as a demonstration
of causal perception (Leslie, 1986; Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000). In
contrast, the need for repeated observation or an increase in causal
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Increase in accuracy as a function of the order in
which a decision was made, shown separately for men and women.
(B) Decrease in latency as a function of decision order, shown
separately for men and women and self-related experience playing
video games. Experience was analyzed as a continuous variable (0–24)
but has been dichotomized here into low (0–11) and high (12–24) for
presentation purposes. All lines are those derived from the best ﬁtting
statistical model.
judgment accuracy over time suggests the action of an inferential
process based on evidence accumulation (Shanks and Dickinson,
1987; Wasserman, 1990; Young, 1995). Although the ability to
make any ﬁrm claims regarding perception versus inference is lim-
ited by the absence of data on exactly how many times a player
observed each relationship (a shortcoming due to the use of a free
operant task), I examined data that might provide some indica-
tion in favor of perception versus inference. If most participants
demonstrated an immediate recognition of the causal relationship
between the cause and its effect, then accuracy should be perfect
for those participants; the learning effects may be an averaging
artifact produced by a small number of observers who must adapt
to the environment. In contrast, if most participants are making
mistakes despite their opportunity to observe multiple shots by
each candidate, this is inconsistent with an automatic process thus
suggesting that an effortful inference is required.
When examining the accuracy of individual performance at all
seven choice points, 17 of the 104 women were perfect and 36 of
the 108 men were. Because the small number of perfect judgers
could be affected by an initial unfamiliarity with the game, I re-
examined the issue after the ﬁrst three decisions points – 42women
and 62 men were perfect on the last four decisions indicating that
a sizeable number were still making mistakes despite their ability
to extend their observation time to ensure greater accuracy. Fur-
thermore, there was no evidence that participants who took longer
to make their decisions were more likely to be correct. Figure 2
shows the median latencies for each individual as a function of
their accuracy. The only obvious relationship evident in the ﬁgure
is the longer latencies for women at every level of accuracy, even
among those who achieved perfect performance. In sum, the judg-
ment is not easy, automatic, and consistent in the same manner as
perceptions of direct causal relationships like the launching effect.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although the causal relationship being observed in the game was
quite simple, involving no delays or uncertainties, most partici-
pants showed evidence of imperfect accuracy and often observed
multiple instances of the relationship before making a decision
FIGURE 2 | Median latency to make a decision for individual
participants with each level of accuracy across the seven decisions.
(averaging about ﬁve shots for men and nine shots for women
after removing time related tomovement and shooting). This need
to observe could be driven by the possibility that the candidate
causes can occasionally ﬁre in very close temporal proximity thus
confounding the determination of causation, but it also could be
driven by the unfamiliarity of the causal relation. Unlike the phys-
ical interaction of objects being mimicked in studies of Michotte’s
launching effect, the relationship between the ﬁring of a video-
game weapon and a distal explosion certainly does not carry the
same experiential basis as billiard ball causation. Indeed, our adop-
tion of a video game platformwas partiallymotivated by the desire
to study causal relations that must be learned through experi-
ence, thus comparable to other environments in which causality
is not directly perceived like medicine, chemistry, education, or
technology. When people interact with modern technological
environments with invisible forces and mechanisms and causal-
ity at a distance, the causal dynamics are quite unlike those found
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in the natural environment in which our species evolved. Even a
person born a millennium ago would ﬁnd the relationships pro-
duced by modern technology more akin to magic than arising due
to physical laws.
SEX DIFFERENCES
Discovering causal relationships appears to be a basic process
which, when mastered, provides a signiﬁcant advantage to mem-
bers of every species. Individual members of a species, however,
may differ in the method of identifying a causal relationship, the
time it takes to do so, and the contexts inwhich it is done efﬁciently.
We observed substantial differences between men and women in
accuracy and observation time within the context of a video game
task. Differential experience with video games explains part of the
latency differences among participants (see right side of Figure 1),
but a large sex difference remained after controlling for experi-
ence and persisted even after gaining experience within the game.
Prior causal decision making studies involving the same gaming
platform (Young and Nguyen, 2009; Young et al., 2011a,b) only
examined performance after the initial seven choices to decrease
the effects of unfamiliarity with game controls. These studies occa-
sionally revealed that differences in accuracy between women and
men disappeared when controlling for self-reported prior gam-
ing experience, but latency differences persisted and remained
substantial. The present analysis of early behavior in the game
is consistent with these previously published results.
Given the consistent sex differences observed in our causal
learning task, why do they occur? When we ﬁrst began using a
game-based methodology, we suspected that men and women
might differ due to their divergent experiences playing video
games. However, even when this factor has been statistically
controlled, the large differences in latency remain. Furthermore,
impulsivity experiments involving the same gaming environment
fail to show sex differences (e.g., Young et al., 2011c, 2013). How-
ever, the trappings of a ﬁrst-person-shooter video game may be
off-putting for a subset of our participants, especially women
who might have been socialized to dislike male-stereotyped video
games (Lucas and Sherry, 2004).
Alternatively, a speed-accuracy tradeoff could be driving the
difference if women are waiting longer to increase accuracy due to
aversion to risk (Kimura, 2000; Frederick, 2005), but there was no
evidence of such a tradeoff – women observedmuch longer before
deciding, but waiting did not result in higher decision accuracy.
Another possibility is that the visual and spatial nature of the task
might be producing a sex difference similar to that observed in
certain other spatial tasks (Kimura, 2000). Although a handful of
published studies involving causal decision making tasks report a
small male advantage (Shaklee and Hall, 1983; Wasserman et al.,
1983;Wasserman and Neunaber, 1986; Nguyen et al., 2010; Young
et al., 2011a), most studies do not include sex as a predictor thus
making it difﬁcult to appeal to a task-based explanation. I uncov-
ered only one report of a sex difference in a causal perception task
involving adults, with men more likely to judge a relationship as
causal (Tschacher and Kupper, 2006).
Regardless of their source, the existence of these differences
early in the gaming task reveals that men and women differ in
their success at discovering the causal relationships in this complex
environment. These individual differences are likely to be signif-
icantly reduced with extensive training and experience, but the
degree to which they can be eliminated remains an open question
and depends on the source of the performance disparity across
sexes.
CAUSAL DISCOVERY IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS
Other than, perhaps, the simplest forms of physical causality
involving contact (Michotte, 1946/1963;White, 1988), causal rela-
tions must be inferred as a function of experience. The presence
of spatial and temporal contiguity and a high contingency enables
strong prediction of the consequences of certain actions or events.
However, even when the cues to causality are all present, complex
environments can confound these cues in the presence of multiple
candidate causes. When two candidates co-occur or nearly so, it is
not possible to easily distinguish between them as causes of an out-
come after a single observation. Therefore, even in otherwise ideal
conditions people sometimes need to observe a series of events
multiple times to gain sufﬁcient conﬁdence in their judgment to
identify a cause. Interestingly, people in the game were learning
to engage in this causal discovery process more efﬁciently as they
performed the task. Not only did their accuracy increase with each
decision, but their latencies decreased due to more efﬁcient travel
and, likely, shorter observation times (Figure 1). Given the nature
of many causal decisionmaking environments, from the diagnosis
of disease to the tracking of information on device control pan-
els, a greater understanding of both the genesis and application of
causal knowledge in the face of complexity will determine whether
the standard cues to causality sufﬁce or if new processes emerge
(Young, 2012).
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